Introduction
In the rapidly growing literatures on urban development in China, many authors have emphasized the salient decentralisation of economic governance and the increasingly significant role of local state. It is argued, for instance, that the distinctive decentralised form combined with proper incentives allows local state to play an increasingly corporatist role (Oi, 1992 (Oi, , 1995 ; that local state is stepping into some form of organization with a great capacity to manage public industry as a diversified market-oriented firm (Walder, 1995) ; that the empowered local state has directly involved in the market economy through establishment of own business that is genuinely entrepreneurial in the sense of profit-seeking, risk-taking and productive (Duckett, 1998) ; that the central state, although still politically dominating, has become less relevant in local economic sphere because of a series of reform packages like fiscal reform (e.g. Wong et al, 1995) ; and that former centrally organized institution is now undergoing a process of 'de-hierarchisation', which gives rise to the 'territorialisation' of place-based socio-institutional form in urban development (F Wu, 2 2002). These discourses suggest a widely recognised and intensively researched phenomenon in post reform China -scalar shift of the state's functions downwards in capital accumulation and commoditised urban transformation. Whatever their differences of terminology, research objectives and interpretations are a focus on the accelerated re-articulation of state functions downwards to lower level of politico-institutional organization, which leads in turn to a systematic reworking of the traditional statehood under socialism. This downscaled state function is said to invigorate a process of territorialisation through which local state re-consolidates its power with the jurisdictional capacity to regulate all local activities regardless of their affiliation (F Wu, 2002) . In this sense, urban development, unlike pre-reform situation, is being increasingly attached to and embedded in places and territories on sub-national scale, i.e. municipality. With these theoretical interpretations, it is tempting, at first glance, to read the contemporary urban transformation in China only as a major consequence of the decentralisation process.
One significant character in these interpretations is that they focus only upon one side of the changing urban governance -decentralisation of statehood. Such analyses neglect a counter-trend in which the central state has de-territorialised and re-hierarchisatized some key functions through state regulatory regime. This counter-trend of state reorganization at least equally contributes to the significance of economic governance nowadays. Neglecting this point may cause only partial understanding of the changing institutional architecture and process of space commodification in urban China. In other words, we argue that the process of decentralisation of economic governance is counterbalanced by the rise of state strategies to control the articulation of scales through which a more centrally 3 consolidated power can be achieved.
This argument is elaborated through a discussion of urban land governance which is currently being de-territorialised and re-centralised for better regulation. The trend of recentralisation is not conceived here as the 'legacy of authoritarianism' or 'continuum of state socialism'. Rather, the nature of recentralised state function is redefined by the imperative of market development, making the state fundamentally different from the former counterpart. On this basis, re-articulation of the state function is analysed as expressions of reactive trends to new governance issues. State reconstruction in contemporary cities is not a unique phenomenon only found in China. It is also reflected in the rescaled urban governance in the transition of capitalist state (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2002) . However, post socialist transition provides a unique experience because of its path-dependent nature. The case of China can therefore, present a good evidence to assess some outstanding features of emerging governance in transitional cities.
This study is an initial effort to examine the state reorganization in China, which is counter devolution that has been widely studied. Following this introduction, section two discusses the perspective to look at state re-organization. Section three examines the contextual changes inside and outside the state that have driven the state to rehierarchisatize and re-centralise its structure in land administration. In section four, re-articulation of government structure is examined, which is followed by a detailed examination of land governance. At the end of this paper, a brief introduction reflects on land governance and its significance for research into urban governance. It is offered to propose that new interpretations of 'commoditised urban transformation ', 4 especially 'commoditised production of the built environment', should be understood by underscoring the interplay between trends of decentralisation and territorialisation and counter-trends of recentralisation and hierarchisation.
The perspective on state reconstruction
The aim of this section is to highlight perspectives -how to look at state reorganization in the face of market reform and globalisation. The role of state in transitional cities is an enduring topic. The real issue is not whether the state should play a role but what and how that role should be played (Stiglitz, 1994) . Indeed, the thesis of state governing market is not confined to transitional economies. The Keynesian type of welfare state (KWNS) offered a distinctive set of national policies to support mass production and consumption from demand perspective in capitalist cities. The justification of such intervention at national scale is market failure. Jessop (2002) further examines the reconstruction of national territorial space when the capitalist state is transformed from KWNS to the post-Fordist accumulation regime, and to what he describes as the 'Schumpeterian competition state'. The new regulatory regime supports supply-side factors to develop the capacity of structural competitiveness and facilitate labour market flexibility and mobility. This defines a reworking of national territorial space, in which state functions are re-articulated upwards, downwards and outwards so that place-and territory-specific strategies of economic development can be mobilized and achieved. Two of Jessop's fundamental premises are particularly useful to form appropriate perspectives on state 5 reconstruction. One is that the capitalist mode of production is an object of regulation by the state because the market cannot be self-regulating. This regulating state 'comprises an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularized and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces and actions organized around (or at least involved in) the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation' (Jessop, 2002: 5) .
The other premise is concerned with the trends how the capitalist state restructures itself in the face of regime shift and impacts of globalisation and regional integration.
The overall trend is the establishment of new scales and arenas for state intervention. Brenner (1999: 447) has argued at length that the state reconstruction as politics of scale can be construed as a sequence of groping, trail-and-error strategies to manage the intensively conflictual forces of globalisation through the continual construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of relatively stabilized configurations of territorial organization. Jessop (2002) persuasively distinguishes three trends (denationalization, destatization, and internationalization) and counter-trends (increased scope for state in interscalar articulation, increased role for state in megagovernance, and interiorization) of state reorganization in capitalist transition. He indicates that these trends and counter-trends should not be deliberately presented in a one-sided and undialectical manner, because they are intertwined with each other. Counter-trends must be viewed as 'reactions to the new trends rather than as survivals of earlier patterns' in the face of globalisation (Jessop, 1999: 26) . If China is not excluded from the impact of market reform and globalisation, Jessop's writings can provide a useful perspective through which to situate the most recent wave of land institutional reform in relation to the newly emergent, rehierarchizatised, and recentralised forms of state configuration. Crucially, Jessop has particularly emphasized the strategic role of the 6 national state. It is argued that restructuring of capitalist state should not be discussed in terms of the decline of the national state (Jessop, 2002) . Scaled state does not evolve in a zero-sum relationship. Rather, the state is reconstituted to solve the crisis and overcome the hurdles of capital accumulation and social reproduction in order to re-gain its functionality in glurbanization strategies.
In the context of economic transition, state governing society has a new meaning, because the state is more than a market regulator -it becomes essentially a market builder (Wu et al., 2007) . In particular, the state intervention carries a different meaning in 'developmental state' (Cumings, 1999; Castells, 2000) , in which the state legitimizes itself by prioritizing development (Wu et al., 2007) . Castells (2000) argues that a state is 'developmental' when it establishes the principle of legitimacy and ability to promote and sustain development. Inferring from the practice of Japanese industrial growth, the concept of developmental state highlights the role of state bureaucratic organs in establishing strategic alliance with influential business to foster industrial expansion. This finds resemblance with the experience of East Asia industrialisation in which the alternative governance is applied with the state as machine 'governing the market ' (Wade, 1990; Wu et al, 2007) . The concept of developmental state has immense appeal to scholars studying China where state intervention is strong, but views are divergent on to what extent the Chinese government is 'developmental'. Zhu (2004) describes a local state that is so 'developmental' in nature that its pro-growth position undermines the capacity to exercise effective development control. Wu et al (2007) argue that Chinese state moves away from resource distributor to market regulator, and now finally to a more entrepreneurial type of market actors. Thus, local corporatism that prevails in China is 7 different from the developmental state which often presents at the national level and controls a set of policy parameters with greater national 'sovereignty'.
Applying regulation theory to the context of China's transitional cities, Wu et al (2007) further situate the state reconfiguration in the transformation of the regime of accumulation. Previously, socialist regime was characterized by extensive expansion of the means of production, constrained consumption, and forced organised labour process (Wu, 2003) . The new regime after the economic reform is now featured by intensified targeting of cities as strategic sites for accumulation strategies and regulation. Whereas the pre-reform regime emphasized socialist industrialization through redistributive function of the central state, contemporary state regime involves re-conceptualization of the city as the means to overcome the constrain of accumulation through 1) prioritizing scale for intensive accumulation, e.g. by increasing the level of urbanization and encourage rural-urban migration, and reinforcing central city's role in metropolitan governance; 2) commodifying urban space through land and housing market; and 3) adopting global-oriented production through foreign investment and joint ventures (Wu et al, 2007) .
In conjunction with the shift of regime of accumulation, there is a reworking of state territorial space and function. Chinese state has to face an increasing social complexity which has weakened its governing capacity. Rather than retreating from urban functions, the state incurs a re-articulation of functions to insert a more sophisticated structure in local economic governance. With ample evidences, Wu It would be too simplistic to understand the economic reform as a total retreat of state power from economic and social life. The dismantling of the economic command system is undeniable. The state apparatus has abandoned direct allocation of production materials, capital, land, and, to a lesser extend, the workforce, while consolidating its regulatory power at the level of localities (Wu, 2002 (Wu, : 1080 .
In fact, such role of the state in economic governance is seen critical in the context of non-market society for it helps and facilitates, among others, the creation of market institution because the market cannot be perfectly self-regulating. For example, the state abolishes in-kind housing allocation and administrative land allocation to pave way for market institution (e.g. Wang, 2001; Wang et al, 2005) . It is also directly involved in knocking down old neighborhoods and making prestigious spaces to create market demand (e.g. He and Wu, 2005; Xu and Yeh, 2005) . This observation leads to the first implication -with a sophisticated governance structure, decentralisation does not mean reduction of state intervention and relaxation of control.
The second observation is closely related to the role of the central state as a strategic site of economic governance. As discussed, it is widely believed that the primacy of the central state now declines in local economic growth. Retreating from local governance was purposely designed by the central state during the early reform period. Qian and Weingast (1997) (Brenner, 2003) .
Another key issue, in the present context, is how to look at the nature of state intervention. That the state continues to play a role in economic development at both central and local levels should not be read as the 'legacy of state socialism'. Rather, there is a substantial change of the nature of such intervention (Wu et al, 2007) . W Zhang (2000) assesses the transformation of Chinese state from an anti-market totalitarian state into a largely pro-business authoritarian state. Particularly in the sector of developing landed property, a number of scholars have also identified a qualitative new form of state that commodifies the 'place' as space commodity (e.g. Yeh and Wu, 1996; Yeh, 2005) . This consideration, together with those mentioned above, provides a state-theoretical perspective on which to interpret the re-articulation of state function in landed property. and represented an essential government function of territorial political-economic institution. But even with such a system, commodification of urban space still leave cities spoiled in many cases, whether by state-initiated large scale development activity, the dereliction of idle sites, the rampant illegal land uses, or the apparent irrationality of new buildings unrelated to surroundings. These outcomes raise the question of whether city planning is implicated in regulating the market transition (for details on development control failures see Xu and Ng, 1998; Yeh and Wu, 1999; Ng and Xu, 2000; Xu, 2001) . Regulatory land control is thus arguably becoming an important alternative way of the state's involvement in space commodification (for example see next section).
Changing conditions inside and outside the state

Changing conditions inside the state
The conditions upon which land politics are developed are found both inside and 11 outside the state. There are three major factors inside the state that drive the trends of re-hierarchisation and re-centralisation of statehood in land governance.
The first factor associates with decentralisation and local disobedience. Chinese governments, both modern and historic, have been dogged by problems of local compliance (Wedeman, 2001: 59) . Since the economic reform, local disobedience becomes more difficult to control for state functions are increasingly devolved to low tiers of governments. During the pre-reform period, production was organized on a 'sectoral and hierarchical basis'. Local state was not entitled for territorial governance.
It only followed central orders and provided infrastructure and services that could not be covered by the hierarchical system to sustain socialist regime of production. After the economic reform, local economic activities are more territorially organised and involve greater emphasis on economic growth, capital intake, and competitiveness.
Under the new regime of capital accumulation, the main concerns of the central and local state are now partially departed. For the central government, the concern is how to restructure its regulatory tools to exercise enough control of discretionary local state and market to ensure that its outcomes are within the manageable scope without destroying local incentives as well as the very mechanism of the state. For the local governments, the concern has become how state institutions can improve the competitiveness of economies and sustain growth in the face of market reform and globalisation. For example, there is a growing local interest in creating new institutions (e.g. development zones, science parks, university towns) to open more space for capital accumulation (Cartier, 2001; Wei and Leung, 2005) .
The transfer of powers to low levels not simply leads to empowered local state, but 12 also creates a delicate and uneasy relationship between the central and local government. Zhang (1999) observes that the centre no longer feels confidence enough politically to rely on the provinces to collect revenue. Xu and Yeh (2005) Gaubatz, 1999 Gaubatz, , 2005 Wu, 2000a Wu, , 2000b Xu and Yeh, 2003, 2005 
Rearticulating the government structure
In this session, we investigate how the central state attempts to retain control over the articulation of different spatial scales. We emphasize the emerging structure of re-centralisation and reconsolidated hierarchical system in local economic governance.
Decentralisation of statehood does not necessarily mean the decline of central state. This means a province may challenge, overrule, or ignore decisions made by a ministry. Similarly, a ministry cannot rule over a province because they are the same rank. This posed a problem for the centre because it has gradually lost independent means of enforcing its authority to prevent localism or impose nationwide standards.
As a result, starting from the early 1990s, China began to reform its central administrative organizations in order to enhance their roles in economic regulations. Our discussion in this section suggests that decentralisation engenders the space for 30 local resurgence, but it also extends the scope for the central state to meditate the increasing complexity of local scales of actions. While local institutions may have wider range of activities that they undertake and seek to influence, and while the central state may have less formal responsibility, the latter could retain a key role in the process of local political-economic governance. We now turn to examine the trend of re-hierarchisation and recentralisation using land governance as an example.
New land management system
Land management is an essential government function that is performed through the Setting up SLMB helped to form a five-tied land administration system at central, provincial, municipal, county, and township levels, under which local governments, especially municipalities and counties, were given much power in land disposal.
Transferring the land management power from work-units to local governments can certainly create a favourable condition for local growth and better land use control.
But it is also required that upper level land departments have to supervise the lower level. This means that local land department is virtually under dual leadership.
Territorially, it is under the administrative control of local government, but hierarchically it is subordinated to technical supervision of corresponding agencies at 32 higher level. Administrative control and technical supervision has fundamental difference. The former refers to the statutory power in cadre appointment and fiscal allocation, while the latter means the capacity in sectoral oversight. Because the city land department is administratively subservient to the municipal government, there are many ways by which the government can limit the actions of the former. The key cadres of the department, for instance, can be appointed directly by the municipality.
It also depends on the municipality for finance. There are also other supervisory methods such as advice and orders given by the municipal government to the land department. Comparably, the technical supervision is a much weaker way of control. than by local governments. The 'hierarchical linkage' is thus strengthened. Because of this change, the provincial land authority should have a structure of regional agencies, which can act as 'the eyes and ears' of the land authority. However, land departments are still dependent on local finance. In this sense, a municipal land department is subordinated to the provincial land department in terms of personnel and technical guidance (hierarchical) but still dependent on the municipality for finance (territorial).
One cannot deny that the municipality has, in effect, a controlling role over land issues through its financial responsibilities. As the HLMS reform is only applied to governments below provincial level, it has been called a partial reform. This has two implications: first central-provincial relationship remains unchanged, and second land administration of municipalities at provincial and sub-provincial level remains untouched.
Recentralization of land authorization power
Recentralization of land authorization power is reflected in the changing division of labors among hierarchical agencies in land administration. To understand the foundation of current land administration in a once centrally-planned economy 34 requires a brief interpretation of how land use was administered in the former system.
The land development process in a centrally planned economy was featured by both concentration and fragmentation. The decision-making was highly centralized within the central governments through resource control of economic planning. It was also fragmented among a vast number of state production units and institutions. While the state was the de jure owner of land, work units were the de facto land users and managers. This structure made territorially organized land development difficult.
The 1986 Land Administration Law established a system in which territorial governments were granted power to perform functions in land administration. In a sense, the new system incorporated fragmented land units into unitary control of territorial governments, which had substantial power in authorizing land expropriation, land supply and rural land conversion (Wu et al, 2007) . This arrangement was meant to grant certain flexibilities at lower level in order to promote local growth. These designations subject a large proportion of China's total arable land base to a high degree of administrative oversight, making it less attractive to potential developers. Under the new framework, municipality can only grant land uses for specific projects using extant construction land, while district no longer has legal jurisdiction in major land administration.
Re-hierarchisation of administrative structure and re-centralisation of state power in land management are further supported by a series of policies to restrict local discretion, to control capital flow, and to safeguard the interests of the disadvantaged. Considerable evidence now exist that reworking of the policy framework is now underway. This development accompanies a dramatic restructuring of market configuration in commodifying space in urban China.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that facing the complication of changing urban conditions, there is a resurgence of state's regulatory power, oriented towards the priority of 're-centralisation' and 're-hierarchisation' in Chinese cities. This is counter devolution 36 which is widely studied in the literature of China's urban governance. Using the case of land governance, we have outlined the basic elements of a theoretical interpretation of these emerging state initiatives. We have found that in conjunction with the re-hierarchisation of institutional structures, state power has also been pervasively give rise to the development of 'entrepreneurial city' where the territorial state becomes more concerned with local, regional and even global competitiveness.
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Supply-driven economic policies are being linked more directly to diverse forms of infrastructure investment and property-led growth. They are attempted to enhance place-specific socio-economic assets. With these three trends of state restructuring sweeping across China, a decentralized structure has been justified as a basic institutional precondition for promoting territorial development. In this manner, urban governance is being redefined from a hierarchical, authoritative and redistributive pattern within a centrally dominated system into a territorial, competitive and developmentalist pattern with cities competing against one another to attract capital investment and central policy inclination. Outside the state, growing forces of social complexity have weakened the governing capability of the state. This is especially evident in the fusion of local state discretion with non-state forces (e.g. developer, speculator, and home purchasers) in landed property at the expense of social objective.
Two results are discernible. One is social exclusion with a rising degree of marginalization. The other is spatial fragmentation either because of the failure of the cellular urban space in accommodating the fluidity of urban activities (thus informal space) or because of the inability of development control in guiding land uses.
State-led development (e.g. university town, development zone, and science park) also contributes to the escalating fragmented nature of urban space.
Indeed, the decentralisation and fragmentation has grown markedly in the past decade.
But even this trend is overshadowed by a wave of consolidation that is at least equally powerful. The more the structure is fragmented, the more centralized the top-level control operation might become. For example, when central policy fails because of countermeasures at the bottom, the central state is attempting to rearticulate the scalar relations so that a more centrally consolidated power can be achieved. Our Re-hierarchisation in economic planning system is also widely discussed. In this sense, new interpretations of 'commoditised urban transformation', especially 'commoditised production of the built environment' within contemporary Chinese cities, should be understood by underscoring the interplay between trends of decentralisation and territorialisation and counter-trends of recentralisation and hierarchisation.
